Western New England Law Review
Volume 18 18 (1996)
Issue 1 SYMPOSIUM: INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES

Article 6

1-1-1996

INSURANCE COVERAGE ACTIONS: WHO,
WHERE, AND WHEN TO SUE
Steven R. Gilford
Robert M. Fogler

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Steven R. Gilford and Robert M. Fogler, INSURANCE COVERAGE ACTIONS: WHO, WHERE, AND WHEN TO SUE, 18 W. New
Eng. L. Rev. 123 (1996), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss1/6

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New
England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

INSURANCE COVERAGE ACTIONS: WHO,
WHERE, AND WHEN TO SUE
STEVEN
ROBERT

R. GILFORD
M. FOGLER*

INTRODucnON

Recent years have seen a marked increase in the vulnerability
of employers to a variety of claims by former employees. In addi
tion to federal actions for discrimination under statutes such as the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),2 the Equal Pay Act,3 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act,4 a broad array of state statutory and common
law causes of action can give rise to claims as well. Common law
tort suits may raise claims under diverse theories including wrong
ful and retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, defamation, and
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
All of these kinds of lawsuits, whether asserted by a present or
former employee, raise difficult issues of how to defend and handle
a claim. In addition, these claims raise important insurance and risk
management issues and require coordination among human re
source personnel, risk managers, and labor and insurance lawyers.
In this Article, we review some basic issues that must be con
sidered in bringing an action for insurance coverage, particularly
where coverage for employee claims against employers are at issue.
The Article assumes that the company has already given an insurer
appropriate notice of a claim and that the insurer has reserved its
rights to disclaim coverage on a variety of grounds.
* Steven R. Gilford is a partner and Robert M. Fogler is an associate at Mayer,
Brown & Platt. Both specialize in insurance coverage and commercial litigation. The
authors wish to thank Andrew L. Reisman for his invaluable help with the completion
of this paper. © All rights reserved, Steven R. Gilford and Robert M. Fogler, 1995.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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THE IMPORTANCE OF FORUM SELECTION

One of the most difficult and significant issues in bringing an
action for insurance coverage is the determination of where to file
suit. The issue is critical because the choice of forum normally gov
erns choice of law, and the determination of which law applies to a
particular issue can frequently be outcome determinative.
A simple example illustrates the problem. Assume, for in
stance, that a large multistate corporation domiciled in Illinois
purchases an insurance policy from an Illinois insurance company
through an Illinois broker and that the policy provides comprehen
sive general liability coverage for occurrences arising anywhere in
the United States. Assume further that the corporation has a plant
in Texas and is sued for compensatory and punitive damages for
wrongful discharge of an employee in Houston.
Focusing on the issue of punitive damages alone, the selection
of controlling law may be outcome determinative. Though subject
to exceptions, l11inois law is generally viewed as not permitting in
surance coverage for punitive damages arising out of the insured's
own misconduct. s Texas law, on the other hand, normally yields the
opposite result. 6 Thus, to'the extent it controls choice of forum and
consequently choice of law, the forum selection process may ulti
mately determine whether the insured can obtain coverage for pu
nitive damages or not.
The importance of forum selection is not limited to the insura
bility of punitive damages. Controlling legal principles pertaining
to a number of critical issues in insurance coverage litigation vary
significantly from state to state. These include the determination of
what policy is triggered by a particular occurrence,7 whether admin
istrative proceedings give rise to a duty to defend,s how responsibil
ity is to be allocated among multiple policies if more than one must
5. Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(Illinois may permit insurance for punitive damages based on vicarious liability). See
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 568 N.E.2d 9, 15 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 116 (1991).
6. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d
693,703-04 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R.
NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 14.06 (7th ed. 1994).
7. Compare, e.g., Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1113
(Wash. Ct. App.) ("pattern or practice" discrimination triggers every policy in effect
during the pattern or practice), rev. denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1021 (1986) with Appalachian
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1982) (limiting coverage to the
policy in effect when the injury from the pattern or practice first manifested itself).
8. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.

1996]

WHO, WHERE, AND WHEN TO SUE

125

respond to a particular 10ss,9 the meaning of "expected and in
tended,"lo and whether insurance for certain conduct is contrary to
public policy.ll In the context of D&O insurance, different states
apply different legal principles in determining the extent to which
defense or settlement costs of a corporation may be allocated to
officers who are covered by the policy.12
The diversity of legal principles that various states apply to
control key legal issues is further complicated by the substantial va
riation in applicable choice of law principles. If every state utilized
the same choice of law principles, jurisdictional variations in the
laws governing key coverage issues would have little relevance to
forum selection; different jurisdictions applying the same choice of
law principles would theoretically yield the same results. The fact
is, however, that there is substantial variation among jurisdictions
with respect to choice of law principles.
For this reason, the selection of the proper forum for asserting
an action for insurance coverage frequently presents a tortuous an
alytical road. For each potentially available jurisdiction, the puta
tive plaintiff must first consider the choice of law principles that will
be applied by that forum and then look at the law of the various
jurisdictions to which application of the governing choice of law
principles is likely to lead. The problem is further compounded by
the fact that under most choice of law principles, different jurisdic
tions may control different issues in the same coverage case. 13
Thus, forum selection requires a three-step analysis of: (1) where
the party can sue, (2) what choice of law principles would be ap
plied to critical legal issues in potentially applicable jurisdictions,
and (3) which of these jurisdictions would apply the most favorable
substantive law on each critical issue.

9. Compare, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 823
F.2d 708,712 (2d Cir. 1987) (prorating responsibility in the ratio that the insured's limits
bear to the sum of all available coverage) with Reliance Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus
Lines Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 1288, 1292 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying the "equal share" method
of apportioning responsibility).
10. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1431-33 (9th Cir.
1995); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 368 (7th Cir. 1990).
13. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 6 cmt. f (1971); In re
Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982,821 F.2d 1147, 1169
n.38 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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WHO SHOULD BE SUED?

Of course, prior to beginning the forum selection analysis the
plaintiff must determine who to sue. For a policyholder seeking to
obtain insurance coverage through litigation, the basic choices are
generally limited to insurers and brokers. 14
A. Insurers

The determination of which insurer to sue is, in most cases,
relatively straightforward. The policyholder must sue the insurer
from whom coverage is being sought. In the simple wrongful dis
charge case, where the former employee is suing for $500,000 with
respect to an incident or series of incidents that took place over a
three-month period, the likelihood is that coverage is available
from only a single insurer, and that insurer is the only logical de
fendant in a coverage action.
This simple scenario can be complicated in a number of ways.
The most obvious complication is when the action involves, or may
involve, more substantial dollars, and an excess insurer must be in
cluded as a defendant in addition to the policyholder's primary
carrier.
A second complication occurs when the incident at issue spans
multiple policy periods. In some cases, this may be because acts of
alleged discrimination span a number of years in which various poli
cies were in effect. A pattern or practice of discrimination, for ex
ample, may trigger every policy in effect from the beginning to the
end of the pattern or practice.1 5
A suit against multiple insurers may also be appropriate where
several different types of policies potentially cover a loss. Consider,
for example, the situation in which a company and senior officer
who are sued for wrongful discharge may have coverage from a
Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy, an Employer Prac
tices Insurance Liablity ("EPLI") policy and a D&O Policy. Each
insurer that issued one of these policies is a potential defendant.
'TYpically, an insured is well advised to sue all potentially re
14. Where an insurer is insolvent, a claim against a guaranty fund or a liquidator
may also be appropriate. Detailed discussion of such claims can be found in A.B.A.,
Law and Practice of Insurance Company Insolvency Revisited (1989).
15. See, e.g., Transport Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325,
1327-28 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108,
1113 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1021 (1986). But see Appalachian Iris.
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1982) (limiting coverage to the
policy in effect when the injury from the pattern or practice first manifested itself).
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sponsible insurers. This avoids the dangers of multiple lawsuits and
inconsistent rulings and may help to avoid an inadvertent failure to
sue a carrier from which coverage is actually available.
B. Brokers and Agents

A broker on which the insured relied in obtaining the relevant
insurance is also a potential defendant in a coverage action. Suits
against the broker typically arise in two situations. 16
First, the insured may have believed it was purchasing insur
ance that would protect it from a discrimination or wrongful dis
charge case. The corporate risk manager's files may disclose that
the broker was specifically asked for this kind of coverage. If the
insurer has taken the position that it did not issue such coverage,
the insured may have an action against the broker for failing to
obtain the coverage that was anticipated. Particularly where the
broker is ambivalent about the availability of coverage, filing a law
suit against the broker may create a significant incentive for the
broker to become more supportive of the policyholder's coverage
claim.
A second situation in which it may be appropriate to sue a bro
ker is where an insurer that provided coverage is insolvent. In
some jurisdictions, the broker may be sued for negligent misrepre
sentation or for negligence in failing to advise the insured of the
risks inherent in purchasing coverage from a particular carrier,17 In
many states, where coverage is purchased on an excess and surplus
basis, the broker has specific statutory responsibilities to advise the
insured of the nature of the insurance coverage and of the policy
holder's inability to secure protection from state guarantee funds. l8
A decision to sue a broker should always be made with ex
treme care. In many cases, the broker knows far more about the
nature and history of the insurance coverage than the policyholder
does. More importantly, the broker often controls the relationship
with the insurers and can be an important ally to the policyholder in
trying to convince the insurer to provide coverage and in attempt
ing to mediate settlement discussions. Obviously, the broker'S will
ingness to fulfill these roles may be undermined significantly if it is
16. For further discussion of suits against insurance brokers or agents, see Os
TRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 18.04; Burke A. Christensen, Insurance Agent or
Broker Liability to the Insured, 10 J. INS. REG. 313 (Spring 1992).
17. See, e.g., Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 638 A.2d 1288,
1296-97 (N.J. 1994).
18. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/445 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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a defendant in the lawsuit and tactically aligned with an insurer who
claims that there is no coverage at all.
If the insured purchases its insurance not through a broker but
through an agent of the insurer, the insured generally cannot sue
that agent,19 If, however, the insurer's agent acts as a dual agent for
both the insured and the insurer, an action against the agent may be
possible. 20 Factors that may affect the agent's status as a dual agent
include whether the agent induced the insured to rely on the agent's
advice and whether the agent developed and maintained a relation
ship with the insured. 21
III. WHERE

CAN

You SUE?

Once you determine the appropriate defendants, the next step
is to determine where those defendants can be sued. The basic ele
ments of the analysis are similar to those in any lawsuit: Where can
you obtain jurisdiction over each defendant? Where is venue
proper? What defenses to forum selection are likely to be encoun
tered in forums where personal jurisdiction and venue are proper?
A.

Personal Jurisdiction

Most major carriers do business in most major states and are
therefore subject to personal jurisdiction under the general trans
acting business provisions of the relevant jurisdictional statutes. In
addition, many states' long-arm statutes reach insurers contracting
to insure a person, property, or risk in the forum state. 22
In most cases, service can be obtained by serving the insurer at
one of its offices or by service on a licensed carrier through the
department of insurance in a particular state. 23 State statutes often
provide that surplus line, foreign and alien insurers must appoint a
state official as their agent for service of process. 24 Where a carrier
is not subject to jurisdiction in a particular state, insurance policies
frequently contain a consent to suit clause, which obligates the in
See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1957).
See, e.g., Kurtz, Richards, Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Communicators Mktg.
Corp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259,263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), reh'g and rev. denied, 12 Cal. App.
19.
20.

4th 1249 (1993).
21. Id.
22. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-209(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
23. E.g., ch. 735, para. 512-204; N.Y. CIY. PRAC. L. & R. 311(1) (McKinney 1990).
24. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/445(10) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (surplus line
service of process statute); ch. 215, para. 5/112 (foreign and alien insurer service of
process statute).
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surer to accept service in any American jurisdiction.25
B.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

State courts are courts of general jurisdiction, that typically
have subject matter jurisdiction over most disputes where personal
jurisdiction is proper. However, the issue of subject matter jurisdic
tion may be critical if a party wants to assert a coverage action in
federal court.
In general, the only basis for accessing the federal courts in a
coverage dispute will be diversity jurisdiction. To determine
whether suit can be filed in federal court based on diversity jurisdic
tion, it is necessary to list the residence of the policyholder and of
each potential defendant (a corporation resides, for diversity pur
poses, at its principal place of business and its place of
incorporation).26
Assuming that the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement
of the diversity statute can be satisfied,27 a federal forum is often
available for coverage actions involving limited numbers of insur
ers. As the number of insurers increases, the likelihood also in
creases that one of the insurers will have the same place of
incorporation or principal place of business as the policyholder and
thereby destroy the possibility of diversity jurisdiction. This is par
ticularly likely to be true if the policyholder is a major corporation
incorporated in Delaware, because many insurers also are incorpo
rated in that state.
It is important to recognize that it is the state of incorporation,
not the state of licensing or regulatory domicile, that controls the
determination of residence for diversity purposes. Foreign insurers,
such as Lloyd's of London, which are not citizens of any American
state, are subject to diversity jurisdiction in a suit with any Ameri
can corporation,28 so long as no other defendant destroys complete
diversity.29
The determination of whether to sue in state or federal court
may carry with it important tactical implications. If the policy
holder wants its case heard in state court, it is obviously important
to join non-diverse parties as defendants in order to eliminate the
25. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
26. 28 u.s.c. § 1332(c) (1988).
27. § 1332(a).
28. § 1332(a)(2)-(3).
29. [d.; see also Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980).
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possibility of removal. Another possibility is to sue in a jurisdiction
where one of the defendants resides. The federal removal statute
does not allow removal of a suit based on diversity jurisdiction if
any of the defendants resides in the state in which the suit is
brought. 30 One of the important considerations in deciding
whether to be in state or federal court is the recognition that cases
in the federal system can be transferred to another venue,31 while in
state court the only possibility is a dismissal on grounds. of forum
non conveniens or transfer within the state.
C.

Venue

Assuming the availability of appropriate personal and subject
matter jurisdiction, there remains the question of proper venue.
The answer to the venue question varies considerably from jurisdic
tion to jurisdiction. Most jurisdictions, however, have rules that are
similar to those found in the federal statutes under which venue is
proper: (1) in any district in which any defendant resides; and (2) in
any district in which "a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred."32 In addition, although no ana
logue exists in federal law, many states have special venue provi
sions concerning insurance companies. In Illinois, for example, an
action against insurers incorporated or doing business in Illinois
may be brought in any county in which any plaintiff resides. 33 Thus,
the law of each potentially available jurisdiction must be carefully
checked to be certain that a forum is available in which venue is
proper as to any parties that the plaintiff intends to include as
defendants.
~

D.

....

Disputes over Forum Selection

Because of the importance of forum in insurance coverage liti
gation, the initial stages of a coverage case are frequently character
ized by substantial disputes over the appropriateness of the
30. The federal removal statute provides:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall
be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988).
31.

32.
33.

§§ 1404, 1406.
§ 1391(a) (Supp. V 1993).

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-103(e) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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plaintiff's forum selection. 34
Disputes over forum selection tend to be rather limited when a
case is first filed in federal court because of the potential for trans
fer to a more appropriate district. Section 1404 of the United States
Judicial Code permits a district court "[f)or the convenience of par
ties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice, [to] transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought."35 Though it may obviously have importance for tac
tical reasons, litigation under section 1404 is not normally important
for choice of law purposes because an action properly brought in a
particular venue, but subsequently transferred for reasons of con
venience, continues to be treated for choice of law purposes as filed
in the original venue. 36
Where the venue in the forum in which the case was originally
filed is improper, as opposed to merely inconvenient, a federal
court can transfer the case to a proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.c.
section 1406. In the event of a transfer pursuant to section 1406, the
case is treated as having been filed in the transferee court, and the
choice of law principles of the transferee court will control,37
Because of the ability of federal courts to transfer cases from
one district to another, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
rarely applicable in federal jurisprudence.38 Most states, on the
other hand, will consider a motion to dismiss on forum non con
veniens grounds where the forum chosen by the plaintiff is "seri
ously" inconvenient, and the more convenient forum is in another
state. 39
Courts may be skeptical of forum non conveniens motions in
situations in which issues are legal and not fact-intensive, and evi
dence is easily transported. 40 Thus, the doctrine of forum non con
34. See, e.g., DeVries v. Bankers Life Co., 471 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
35. § 1404a (1988).
36. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
37. See, e.g., Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'I, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1141 (5th Cir.
1992).
38. There may be situations in which the only insurance policy at issue is a policy
issued outside of the United States by a foreign insurer. In this situation, forum non
conveniens arguments may be possible at the federal level. See American Dredging Co.
v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
39. See, e.g., Anderson v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 309 N.W.2d 539
(Mich. 1981). See generally 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDIcnON IN CIVIL AcnoNS
§ 1.04 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the application of forum non conveniens in state
courts).
40. For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 559 A.2d 1301
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veniens is most often applied in coverage cases involving blatant
forum shopping.
Consider, for instance, our earlier example in which an Illinois
corporation purchases an insurance policy from an Illinois insurer
through an Illinois broker and sues for coverage with respect to a
wrongful termination case where all the facts relevant to the termi
nation take place in Texas. A policyholder may attempt to bring
that action in Delaware because of some belief that it will obtain
more favorable treatment of its case in that court. Our hypothetical
case, however, has no connection with the state of Delaware. None
of the evidence is anywhere near Delaware, none of the parties
have had any relevant contact with the state of Delaware, and the
state of Delaware and its citizens have little or no interest in the
dispute. Under these circumstances, there is a serious possibility
that a court would grant a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum
non conveniens.
Because a state court cannot transfer an action to another ju
risdiction, the doctrine of forum non conveniens requires a com
plete dismissal without prejudice, rather than the kind of transfer
that might take place within the federal system. To avoid pro
tracted litigation and potential forum non conveniens dismissal,
many coverage plaintiffs focus their analysis of potentially available
forums on jurisdictions that have some contact either with the issu
ance of the insurance policy at issue or with the underlying dispute.
Mere incorporation or residency is not normally viewed as a suffi
ciently important contact, in itself, to resist a motion to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens. 41
E.

Consent to Suit

Another issue that is commonly considered in disputes over fo
(Del. Super. Ct. 1988), where the court denied the insurers' forum non conveniens mo
tion, it distinguished insurance coverage cases from other cases:
Courts recognize that most of the issues in insurance coverage actions are legal in na
ture. The Court can resolve them with little or no live testimony. If the Court needed
testimonial evidence the parties could gather the evidence in the form of depositions
and transport it to Delaware. The original location of documentary evidence thus can
not defeat plaintiffs choice of forum .... Also, the size and financial resources available
to the parties substantially attenuates these [substantial burden] concerns.
Id. at 1307 (citations omitted).
41. See also Union Carbide Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 562 A.2d 15
(Conn. 1989) (upholding the dismissal of insured's coverage claim on grounds of forum
non conveniens, even though insured's headquarters was located in the forum state).
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rum selection concerns consent to suit clauses. The traditional con
sent to suit clause provides, in substance, that:
[1]n the event of the failure of Und,erwriters hereon to pay any
amount claimed to be due hereunder, UnderWriters hereon, at
the request of the insured (or reinsured) will submit to the juris
diction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United
States and will comply with all requirements necessary to give
such Court jurisdiction and all matters arising hereunder shall be
determined in accordance with the law and practice of such
Court. 42

Many policyholders have taken the position that such a clause pre
cludes the insurer from asserting a motion to dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens.43 In several cases the insureds also have ar
gued, sometimes successfully, that such a clause precludes the in
surer from removing the action to federal court.44
Although these issues have given rise to hotly contested litiga
tion at the trial and appellate levels, most major carriers have re
vised the consent to suit clause to indicate explicitly that the insurer
retains the right to assert a motion for transfer or to remove to
federal court. For example, policies currently issued by the London
market provide that:
Nothing in this Clause constitutes or should be understood to
constitute a waiver of Underwriters' rights to commence an ac
tion in any Court of competent jurisdiction in the United States,
to remove an action to a United States District Court, or to seek
a transfer of a case to another Court as permitted by the laws of
the United States or of any State in the United States.45

F.

The Possibility of Arbitration

A growing number of insurance policies, particularly high level
excess policies issued in the Bermuda market, include provisions
42. E.g., Price v. Brown Group, Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 414,416 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994).
43. E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 717-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987).
44. Compare Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1216-17 (3d Cir.)
(holding that the consent to suit clause precluded removal), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908
(1991) with In re Texas E. Transmission Corp., 15 F.3d 1230,1242-44 (3d Cir.) (holding
the consent to suit clause did not preclude removal), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 291 (1994).
See generally Foster, 933 F.2d at 1216-17 and cases cited therein, discussing other cases
involving removal and consent to suit clauses.
45. See John G. Hanlin, The Traditional Service of Suit Clause: Choice of Forum
and Law Provision?, 39 FEO'N INS. & CORP. CoUNS. Q. 363, 375 (Summer 1989).
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that explicitly require arbitration of coverage disputes. These arbi
tration clauses are typically enforced by the courts pursuant to man
dates of state and federal arbitration statutes46 and, in many cases,
international treaties. 47 Because of the strong and frequently ar
ticulated judicial and public policy preference for arbitration, most
state and federal courts will grant a motion to compel arbitration
where a policyholder attempts to sue an insurer for coverage under
a policy that includes an arbitration clause.48
G. Necessary and Indispensable Party Litigation
Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the proce
dural rules of most states require a plaintiff to sue every possible
defendant or to join every possible cause of action in a single case. 49
Thus, although it may be expensive and inefficient, some attorneys
consider bringing separate actions in different forums against differ
ent carriers. The defense to this approach is a motion under Rule
19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or its state court
equivalent, for joinder. Rule 19 provides as follows:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the
person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating
to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substan
tial ris~ of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of the claimed interest.50

If a person who should be joined as a necessary party under Rule

19(a) cannot be made a party, "the court shall determine whether in
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being
thus regarded as indispensable. "51
46. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988); see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-336(c) (1993).
47. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
48. See, e.g., Heinhuis v. Venture Assocs., 959 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1992); Preferred
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 643 So. 2d 1101, 1102-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
49. See FED. R. CIY. P. 19(a); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 512-405 (Smith-Hurd
1993).
50. FED. R. CIY. P. 19(a).
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). As noted below, not all states include an equivalent to
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Arguments concerning the necessity of joining an indispensa
ble party are typically raised in coverage cases in two situations.
First, there may be a dispute over which of a number of potentially
applicable policies should respond to a particular loss. In the em
ployment context, this might occur where a policyholder has one
policy in effect in 1994 and a second policy in effect in 1995 and is
confronted with a lawsuit in which the plaintiff alleges a pattern or
practice of discrimination that continued throughout both policy
periods. 52
Another paradigm for necessary party arguments concerns the
situation in which there are multiple insureds under a particular
policy. In this situation, a court may require joinder of the addi
tional insureds so that they are bound by the outcome and cannot
contest the depletion of applicable policy limits on a particular
claim. This situation is most likely to occur where the relevant pol
icy has some kind of aggregate limit that might be depleted by pay
ment of a loss.
The decision of the court in In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 53
is illustrative. In that case, a bankrupt manufacturer of asbestos,
Forty-Eight Insulations, sued numerous insurers for insurance cov
erage under policies purchased by Forty-Eight's corporate parent,
Foster Wheeler Corporation. Because Foster Wheeler was an in
sured under each of these policies, the insurers were concerned that
Foster Wheeler would not be bound by any determination of cover
age issues in litigation with Forty-Eight that might result in exhaus
tion of policy limits. The district court, applying Rule 19(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered Forty-Eight to join
Foster Wheeler as a party defendant and held that "Foster Wheeler
is a necessary party to this action under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) because it
claims an interest relating to the subject of this action, and its ab
sence would subject the defendant insurers to a substantial risk of
multiple or inconsistent obligations."54
Many of the cases on mandatory joinder in the insurance cov
erage context involve situations where the court has relied on FedR. CIY. P. 19(a)(2) in their mandatory joinder rules. See infra note 56 and accom
panying text.
. 52. Compare, Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1113
(Wash. Ct. App.) ("pattern or practice" discrimination triggers every policy in effect
during the pattern or practice), rev. denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1021 (1986) with Appalachian
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1982) (limiting coverage to the
policy in effect when the injury from the pattern or practice first manifested itself).
53. 109 B.R. 315 (N.D. III. 1989).
54. Id. at 319.
FED.
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eral Rule 19(a}(2} or a similar state court rule. 55 It should be noted,
however, that some states do not have an equivalent to Federal
Rule 19(a}(2} and require joinder only where "[the party's] pres
ence in the action is essential to permit the court to render com
plete relief."56 Necessary joinder may be more unlikely under this
standard. 57
IV.

,WHERE SHOULD THE POLICYHOLDER OR INSURER SUE?

Once the potential plaintiff, whether it be an insurer or an in
sured, determines the jurisdiction in which a suit might properly be
brought, the next question concerns the identification and selection
of the preferred forum. This analysis will require consideration of
many of the same factor!) that must be considered in determining
where to file any lawsuit.
A.

Are Some Judges Better Than Others?

There is a series of questions a sophisticated lawyer always
asks in deciding which of several potentially available courthouses
should be the forum for a new lawsuit: Does a particular judge or
jurisdiction have particular biases for or against the parties in
volved? Are there any rules or procedures of a particular jurIsdic
tion that are likely to make it more or less favorable to one's case?
What are the views of potential jurors in the jurisdiction about the
kinds of issues and the parties that might be involved? (For exam
ple, a policyholder would be unlikely to want to assert a coverage
action arising from a racial discrimination case in a black, working
class community.) Is the plaintiff interested in getting his case to
trial quickly or slowly, and what is the backlog in potentially rele
vant jurisdictions?
All of these factors must be considered carefully and will vary
from case to case and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Although many of
these issues will depend on subjective evaluations and attorney ex
periences with particular judges and courts, the issue of controlling
law will require careful legal analysis.
55. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 716
F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 910 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see
also Seaside Resorts, Inc. v. Club Car, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 655, 665 (S.c. Ct. App. 1992).
56. E.g., MCR 2.205(A) (West 1995) (Michigan).
57. See Hofmann v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 535 N.W.2d 529 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995);
Troutman v. Ollis, 351 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
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Choice of Law

Regardless of whether suit is brought in federal or state court,
the law of the forum typically determines choice of law principles. 58
In a diversity case in federal court, conflict of laws issues concerning
substantive matters are normally resolved by reference to the
choice of law principles applied by the courts of the state in which
the federal district court is located. 59 Although simple to state,
these hornbook law principles can be extremely problematic be
cause of the considerable variation in the choice of law principles
used by various jurisdictions in insurance coverage litigation.
1.

Traditional Approach: Place of Contracting

In deciding the controlling law with respect to insurance con
tract disputes, a number of states continue to use the approach es
tablished by the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws ("First
Restatement") under which issues relating to the validity of a con
tract are determined by reference to the law of the place of con
tracting, and issues relating to the performance of the contract are
governed by the lCiw of the place of performance. 60
The approach of the First Restatement. typically focuses on
where the contract at issue was executed and delivered, with the
place of the last act necessary to complete the contract typically
being viewed as the place of contracting.61 Although this approach
is supposed to have the advantage of certainty and predictability, it
often yields substantial differences of opinion in insurance coverage
disputes. For example, when an insurer in one state has issued a
policy through an agent in a second state, who has delivered the
'policy to a broker in a third state, who has delivered the policy to an
insured in a fourth state, substantial litigation over where the con
tract was delivered can result. The situation may be further compli
cated where the insured that is asserting coverage is a subsidiary of
the company that bought the policy and is located in yet a fifth
state. These kinds of situations can yield extensive litigation over
where the policy was signed and countersigned, whether the broker
was an agent of the insured, and related issues.
The complexities of the First Restatement approach are com
pounded by the fact that, unlike questions of contract construction
58. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 3 (1979 & Supp. 1995).
59. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
60. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLlcr OF LAWS § 332, 358 (1934).
61. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 76 (1979 & Supp. 1995).
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that are typically governed by the law of the place of contracting,
questions related to the performance of the contract are typically
governed by the law of the place of performance. 62 This dichotomy
can raise endless litigation about whether a particular issue is a mat
ter of contract validity or construction, on the one hand, or per
formance on the other. As a result, the law of one jurisdiction may
control the issue of rescission, but the law of an entirely different
jurisdiction might control issues such as late notice and the circum
stances under which an insurer is relieved of its coverage obligation
if notice is not given on a timely basis.
2.

Second Restatement: Most Significant Contacts

Recognizing that the location where a contract is executed or
an insurance policy is delivered may have little or nothing to do
with the reasonable expectations of the parties about controlling
law, a number of states have adopted more flexible choice of law
principles. The most common of these is the most significant con
tacts test adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
("Second Restatement"). That approach, which is expressly ori
ented toward the reasonable expectations of the parties, focuses on
a series of factors, including: (1) the needs of the interstate and in
ternational systems; (2) the relevant policies of the forum; (3) the
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interest
of those states in the determination of the particular issue; (4) the
protection of justified expectations; (5) the basic policies underlying
the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability and uniform
ity of result; and (7) ease in the determination and application of
the law to be applied. 63
In attempting to apply these principles, the Second Restatement
focuses on the number of contacts to determine the state with the
most significant relationship to a matter. The contacts considered
include the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, and the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of
business of the parties. 64
The Second Restatement has a special rule for insurance con
tracts. Under section 193, "[t]he validity of a contract of fire, surety
or casualty insurance and the rights created thereby are determined
by the local law of the state that the parties understood was to be
62.
63.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

64.

Id. § 188(2).

358 (1934).
6 (1971).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS §
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the principal location of the insured risk," unless another state has a
"more significant relationship" under general contlict principles. 65
Unfortunately, the focus on the principal location of the in
sured risk is extremely difficult to apply in the context of large mul
tistate corporations. If a California insured with offices and
employees in all fifty states purchases an insurance policy from a
New York insurer and has a wrongful termination claim arising
from its operations in Missouri or a discrimination claim arising
from operations in several states, there may be no clear expectation
of the parties as to the principal location of an insured risk.
Although some courts may tum to the insured's principal place of
business to resolve the issue, that approach may give way in other
situations to a more significant relationship with the state where the
underlying event leading to the covered occurrence took place.
Several courts have accorded special significance to the location of
the risk in choice of law determinations.66
Still other jurisdictions use a governmental interest approach
to resolve contlicts of law. 67 The governmental interest approach
emphasizes the interests of various jurisdictions in having their law
resolve a particular dispute rather than the expectations of the par
ties. Several states, such as California and New Jersey,68 utilize this
approach. The governmental interest approach often tends to give
greater emphasis to forum selection and the forum involved in the
underlying risk.
C.

Key Substantive Issues for Choice of Law Analysis

Once there has been an identification of the forums in which
suit can be filed and of the choice of law principles courts in those
forums use to select controlling law with respect to particular issues,
it is necessary to examine where the application of the relevant
principles may lead. In the remainder of this Article, we identify
some of the issues that may be worthy of consideration.
65. [d. § 193.
66. See, e.g., CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 46 F.3d
1211,1217 (1st Cir. 1995); Glowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 A.2d 593, 595 (N.H. 1991).
67. See, e.g., Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 713,718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187, 1189 (N.J.
1986).
68. Stonewall, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718; Veazy, 510 A.2d at 1189. For a survey of
the choice of law theories used by each jurisdiction, see Gregory E. Smith, Choice of
Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1987).
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Duty to Defend

In many situations, the critical issue driving a coverage case is
the policyholder's desire to obtain prompt insurance payment or
reimbursement of defense costs. In most jurisdictions, the insurer
must defend if the complaint at issue alleges some facts that are
within the policy's coverage, even if the allegations are vague,
groundless, false or fraudulent. 69 However, this is not the rule in all
jurisdictions. For example, some courts may permit an insurer to
avoid defense obligations if the insurer knows of facts, extrinsic to
the complaint, that conclusively eliminate any potential for cover
age,7o The precise rule governing an insurer's defense obligation
and the likelihood that the policyholder can obtain a defense based
on a motion for summary judgment71 may be key elements in deter
mining the suitability of the law of a particular jurisdiction with re
spect to a particular case.
2.

Duty to Defend in Administrative Proceedings

There is sometimes an issue as to how early an insurer's obliga
tion to defend or to pay defense costs begins in a particular case.
Many insurance policies avoid this problem by conditioning defense
obligations on receipt of a complaint or commencement of a suit. 72
These kinds of situations may give rise to significant disputes in sit
uations where judicial litigation is normally preceded by some kind
of administrative procedure or demand.
One of the areas in which such disputes over defense obliga
tions often arise is in the context of employment-related claims
where resort to administrative agencies such as the Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or similar state
agencies is mandatory,73
69. E.g., Interco Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 808 F.2d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 1987) (apply
ing Missouri law); Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 767 F.2d 810, 812
(11th Cir. 1985) (applying Florida law); Thornton v. Paul, 384 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ill.
1978). See also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 5.02.
70. E.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966) (en bane); Cincin
nati Ins. Co. v. Mallon, 409 N.E.2d 1100, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
71. See, e.g., Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 555-56 (Tex. 1989) ("Summary judg
ments in federal courts are based on different assumptions, with different purposes,
than summary judgments in Texas.").
72. See, e.g., Society of Mount Carmel v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 643
N.E.2d 1280, 1288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) '("[the insurer] shall have the right and duty to
defend any suit against the insured") (emphasis added).
73. Under TItle VII, a plaintiff must exhaust EEOC administrative remedies
before bringing suit in a state or federal court. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f) (1988 & Supp.
1993). Many state antidiscrimination statutes also require administrative exhaustion
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At least two courts have held that the duty to defend does not
extend to complaints filed with the EEOC. In Maryland Cup Corp.
v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., the court held there
was no duty to defend because the policy limited the insurer's de
fense obligations to suits "seeking damages," and the EEOC can
only grant equitable relief. 74 Campbell Soup Co. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., held that an EEOC proceeding is not a "suit" and
therefore cannot trigger a duty to defend. 75 These two cases illus
trate the most common arguments against extension of a defense
obligation to administrative proceedings.
In cases that do not involve rights of employees, several courts
have found a duty to defend in situations where the administrative
body is acting "in a judicial capacity." For example, in Detrex
Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau,76 the
court held that Employers had a defense obligation because an ad
ministrative board "acts in a judicial capacity when it hears evi
dence and witnesses, the parties are given an opportunity to brief
and argue their versions of the facts and present arguments, and the
parties are given an opportunity to seek court review of any adverse
findings."77 In environmental cases a number of courts have found
that a letter from a federal agency can trigger a duty to defend. 78
These courts reason that "the administrative process is part of a
'litigious process' that triggers the obligation to defend."79
before a plaintiff may sue in state or federal court. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12965(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 383-84 (Cal. 1990)
(en banc); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 775, para. 5/8-1l1(A) (Smith-Hurd 1993); Castaneda v.
Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 547 N.E.2d 437, 439-40 (III. 1989) .
.. + 74.
568 A2d 1129, 1132-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
75. 571 A2d 969,970-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 230
(N.J. 1990).
76. 681 F. Supp. 438,454 (N.D. Ohio 1987), affd. in relevant part on reconsidera
tion, 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
77. [d. (citing University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788 (1986)). See also Solo
Cup Co. V. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1188 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (A "compliance
review" by the General Services Administration does not trigger a duty to defend, that
"we leave for another day the question of whether the duty to defend ... is necessarily
confined to judicial proceedings."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980).
78. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir.
1991); AY. McDonald Indus. Inc. V. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 628
(Iowa 1991); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. CO. V. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175
(Minn. 1990). But see, Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655
N.E.2d 842 (III. 1995). See generally OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 10.04(c)
(collecting cases).
79. Avondale Indus. V. Travelers Indem. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1314, 1322 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), affd, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989), modified and reh'g denied, 894 F.2d 498 (2d
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Parol Evidence and Rules of Policy Construction

Different forums apply different choice of law rules to deter
mine the governing of the parol evidence rule. Although the tradi
tional view was that the parol evidence rule was an evidentiary
matter controlled by the law of the forum,so more recent cases tend
to view it as a substantive matter often determined by the law of the
jurisdiction whose law controls policy interpretation. s1
Depending on the matter at issue, it mayor may not be in the
interest ofa policyholder or insurer to seek introduction of parol
evidence. In some cases a policyholder or insurer may prefer to
avoid introduction of parol evidence and seek summary judgment.
This approach has the advantage of avoiding the time-consuming
and expensive discovery and trials that often accompany parol evi
dence disputes on matters 'of policy interpretation.
One important factor in deciding whether to seek summary
judgment on matters of policy construction is the extent to which a
policyholder can rely on favorable rules of construction. Where a
contract is ambiguous, the policyholder can, in some cases, rely on
the principle that ambiguous policy provisions must be construed in
its favor, and the burden is on the insurer to introduce extrinsic
evidence to demonstrate that its interpretation of the policy is the
only reasonable one.82 Some courts have refused to apply the tradi
tional rule of construing insurance policies against the insurer in
cases that involve a sophisticated policyholder or a negotiated man
uscript policy.s3
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990), partial final judgment entered, No. 86 CIV.
9626, 1993 WL 427035 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1993).
80. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 132 (1979).
81. E.g., Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 736 F. Supp. 511, 519
n.lO (S.p.N.Y. 1990).
82. See, e.g., Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 971 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("Where an ambiguity cannot be resolved by resort to extrinsic evidence we
resolve ambiguities in insurance policy provisions in favor of the insured.") (applying
California law); Vargas v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1981)
("The insurer bears a heavy burden of proof, for it must 'establish that the words and
expressions used [in the ins1,lI'ance policy] not only are susceptible of the construction
sought by [the insurer] but that it is the only construction which may fairly be placed on
them. "') (quoting Filor Bullard & Smith v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 605 F.2d 598, 602
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979»; Springfield Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Garner, 627 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (III. App. Ct. 1993) ("When a policy provision is ambigu
ous, all doubt must be resolved in favor of the insured."), appeal denied, 633 N.E.2d 15
(1994).
83. E.g., Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068,
1075 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981).
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Can the Case Be Limited to the Duty to Defend?

Another issue that must be considered in determining whether
a duty to defend exists under the law of a particular forum concerns
the extent to which a coverage case can be limited to an insurer's
defense obligations. This is an important tactical consideration.
Most coverage attorneys agree that a policyholder's strategic
planning should give priority to winning the underiying lawsuit and
avoiding liability altogether, rather than plotting to obtain coverage
in the event liability is imposed upon it. A number of insurer cover
age defenses, particularly the defense that there is no coverage be
cause the damages at issue were intentional or "expected or
intended," ally the insurer with the party suing the policyholder. It
is obviously not in the interest of the insurer or the insured to have
the insurer developing evidence that may be used against the in
sured in the underlying case. One approach to this situation is to
attempt to deal with the defense obligation as a matter of summary
judgment based on the policy and the underlying complaint and
then to seek a stay of further proceedings pending resolution of the
case for which coverage is sought. 84 As one court recently
explained:
To the extent the declaratory judgment might resolve an issue
adversely to the insured, it would be inherently unfair to force
the insured to litigate against the insurance company; under
those circumstances, rather than obtaining the benefit of the [in
surer's] resources and expertise in defending against the plaintiff,
those resources, for which the insured had bargained, would be
turned against the insured and used to help establish his or her
liability.85

Such motions for stay are more common where the insurer has
commenced the case, but the policyholder can sometimes structure
the situation by suing for defense and indemnity obligations in sep
arate counts. The availability of a stay will normally depend on a
84. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 847, 851 (N.D. Cal. 1978); A.
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 8.04 (2d ed. 1989) ("The majority of re
cent cases ... have held that a declaratory judgment should not be entered if it depends'
on the resolution of factual disputes that are at issue in the underlying action.").
85. Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 771 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Wyo. 1989) (citation omit
ted). See also Hartford Ins. Group v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1013,1017 (Colo. 1981)
(en banc); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Townsend, 544 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) ("[C]ourts will not permit the insurance company to preempt the resolution of
fact issues necessarily involved in both suits."), overruled by, 595 So. 2d 1005 (Fla.
1992); State Auto. & Casualty Underwriters v. Gardiner, 370 P.2d 91, 93 (Kan. 1962).
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combination of the substantive law of the controlling jurisdiction
with respect to the duty to defend and duty to indemnify and the
procedural law of the forum state as to declaratory judgment ac
tions, bifurcation of trials, and stays of proceedings.
5.

Allocation of Defense Costs

Different jurisdictions apply different legal principles in deter
mining how defense costs should be paid where multiple insurers
have an obligation to pay. Some courts allow the insured to pick
any insurer with a defense obligation reasoning that each insurer
has an independent obligation to defend. 86 Other courts allocate
defense responsibilities among responsible insurers and may allo
cate some of the defense obligation to the insured if there are peri
ods of time it does not have collectible coverage. 87
6.

Unexpected and Unintended: Disparate Treatment vs.
Disparate Impact

Discrimination cases tend to fall into two discrete categories:'
disparate treatment cases and disparate impact cases. Disparate
treatment cases deal with situations in which different groups have
been intentionally treated differently. Disparate impact cases, on
the other hand, tend to involve situations in which otherwise neu
tral conduct has had a disparate impact on different groups.
Claims of disparate impact are, in general, likely to more
clearly trigger a duty to indemnify than claims of disparate treat
ment. Because they usually involve unintentional conduct, dispa
rate impact cases may involve damages that are "unexpected and
unintended," so that coverage is not precluded by policy provisions
that exclude coverage for intentional acts or for injuries expected or
intended by the insured. 88 Disparate treatment cases, in contrast,
often involve intentional discrimination, which may be "expected or
86. See, e.g., Nordby v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Minn. 1983).
87. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 657 F.2d 814, 816
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
88. See, e.g., Solo Cup CO. V. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1181, 1184-85 (7th
Cir.) (finding coverage for unintentional disparate impact discrimination under an "um
brella excess liability policy" issued in 1974), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Union
Camp Corp. V. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (insur
ance against losses resulting from discriminatory employment practices not void as
against public policy); School Dist. No.1 V. Mission Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929, 935-36 (Or.
Ct. App. 1982) (suggesting that unintentional disparate impact discrimination is cov
ered by "errors and omissions" provision in CGL policy), review denied, 662 P.2d 725
(Or. 1983).
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intended" and are therefore not normally a covered occurrence. 89
This distinction highlights the importance of the constructions
of policy provisions that restrict coverage to damage "neither ex
pected nor intended by the insured" utilized by various jurisdic
tions. In most courts, the focus of these kinds of provisions is on
whether the insured expected or intended some damage. 9o Other
courts, however, may focus on whether the act that caused the in
. jury was intended. 91 Where this is the case, an insurer could argue
that the corporate establishment of a policy constitutes intentional
conduct, not subject to coverage, even though there was no intent
to injure anyone at all.92
7.

Intentional Acts Exclusion: Constructive vs. Actual
Wrongful Discharge

Policy exclusions for intentional acts may be extremely impor
tant in wrongful discharge cases. An insurer may deny coverage for
wrongful discharge on the theory that "the actual discharge of an
employee cannot be an accidental event and ... there is no cover
age for such discharge where the policy contains an exclusion for
intentional acts."93 Thus, where plaintiffs allege wrongful dis
charge, some courts hold that insurers need not even defend the
claim. 94
A claim for constructive wrongful discharge is more likely to be
covered by insurance policies as an accidental occurrence. For ex
ample, in Vienna Family Medical Associates, Inc. v. Allstate Insur
ance CO.,95 the insured was sued for "[creating] a hostile work
89. See, e.g., Union Camp Corp., 452 F. Supp. at 567-68 (finding coverage for
unintentional discrimination but not for intentional discrimination); School Dist. No.1,
650 P.2d at 935-36 (same).
90. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W., 206 Cal. Rptr. 609. 612-13 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 816 P.2d 952, 954-55 (Colo. 1991) (en
banc).
91. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Salahutdin, 815 F. Supp. 1309, 1312-13 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
92. See, e.g., E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 726 P.2d 439,
442 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
93. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Medical Lab. Network, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 901,903
. (C.D. Cal. 1988). See also American Quar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Vista Medical Supply,
699 F. Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
94. American Guarantee, 699 F. Supp. at 789-90 (finding no duty to defend for
wrongful discharge because the policy at issue did not cover "[p]urposeful acts"); St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Ra\ee Eng'g Co., 804 F.2d 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
no duty to defend existed where plaintiff alleged wrongful discharge and intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
95. 872 F. Supp. 1509 (S.D.W. Va. 1995).
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environment and constructively discharg[ing] [the plaintiff] from
her employment with the intent to retaliate."96 The court declared
that the insurer must provide a defense and indemnification for all
claims alleging negligent conduct. 97 Other courts have been more
skeptical of claims alleging constructive discharge and have held
that in some circumstances the employer can be presumed to have
"intended" that the employee resign. 98
8.

Late Notice

Although we assume for purposes of this article that the policy
holder has given prompt and appropriate notice, there are situa
tions in which a carrier defense of late notice may be crucial to a
coverage case. There are substantial variations in the law that vari
ous jurisdictions apply to late notice defenses. Jurisdictions are split
as to whether an insurer is required to show prejudice to support a
late notice defense. 99 Even in states that require insurers to show
prejudice, there may be variations in the standard for showing prej
udice. loo In addition, different courts may afford varying degrees of
significance to notice received by the insurer from third parties
96.

Id. at 1512.
Id. at 1513.
98. E.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Medical Lab. Network, Inc., 690 F. Supp.
901, 903-04 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that because the insured had '''knowledge of the
intolerable actions and conditions and of their impact on the employee,'" it was pre
sumed that the employer "intended" that the employee resign). See also the recent
decision of an Illinois appeals court in Society of Mt. Cannel v. National Ben Franklin
Insurance Co., 643 N.E.2d 1280 (Ill. App. O. 1994), in which the court held that mere
allegations of negligence will not automatically trigger a duty to defend:
Here [the underlying plaintiff's] complaint seeks recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. However, the complaint sets forth no negli
gent acts or any facts from which such negligence can be inferred. Rather, the
acts upon which that count is based are the very same acts which underlie
every other count of the [plaintiff's] complaint, the intentional discharge.
Thus, the count alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress does not con
stitute an occurrence or accident under the terms of the comprehensive gen
eral liability policy. . . .
.
Id. at 1289.
99. E.g., Collin v. American Empire Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 409 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) ("Under California law, an insured's breach of these conditions will relieve
the insurer of liability if it is actually prejudiced by the late notice."); but see Hoechst
Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV A. 89C-SE-35, 1994 WL
721639, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) ("New York law, however, does not require a show
ing of prejudice in conjunction with proof of late notice.").
100. Compare Baugh Constr. Co. v. Mission Ins. Co., 836 F.2d 1164, 1174 (9th
Cir. 1988) (Washington law) with Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 219,
223-24 (Conn. 1988).
97.
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other than the policyholder. 101
9. Trigger and Allocation
In situations in which a course of conduct on which liability is
based spans an extended period of time, there are always significant
coverage issues about which policies are triggered and that should
respond. Discrimination and wrongful discharge claims are no
exception.
Practitioners familiar with the massive cases concerning cover
age for asbestos injuries and environmental risks will already be fa
miliar with the concepts of injury in fact, manifestation, and double,
triple, and continuous trigger.1 02 In the employment context, a pat
tern or practice of discrimination that continues for more than one
policy year may trigger multiple policies. However, some cases
have held that the policies are triggered when the injury manifests
itself.103
,10.

Discovery

Discovery in a significant coverage action can be contentious.
In addition to requests for claims and underwriting files relating to
the policy and claim at issue, the insured may seek sensitive insurer
documents concerning drafting history, correspondence with rein
surers, and, in some cases, information about other claims and loss
reserves. The insurers, on the other hand, may seek confidential
policyholder documents, prepared in the underlying action or for
other purposes, that may be privileged.,

a.

Drafting history and documents related to policy construction

Where the interpretation of an insurance policy is at issue, the
insured may seek documents and other discovery pertaining to the
drafting history of relevant policy provisions. 104 This may include
attempts to discover documents from files of the Insurance Service
Office or similar organizations whose forms may have been utilized
101. Compare American Home Assurance Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., 984 F.2d 76,
78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2964 (1993) with Mahone v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 373 S.E.2d 809,811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
102. For a discussion of various trigger theories, see Armstrong World Indus., Inc.
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35, 49-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
103. See supra note 7.
104. E.g., Champion Int'l Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 63, 67
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Heyman Assocs. No.1 v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 653 A.2d 122, 128 n.10
(Conn. 1995).
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in preparation of the relevant provisions. lOS
The insured may also attempt to gain access to files concerning
other policyholders who may have had similar coverage disputes.
Evidence of positions that carriers have taken with other insureds,
with respect to similar or identical policy language, may be discov
erable on the theory that it is relevant to contract interpretation. 106
In significant part, the discoverability of these kinds of materi
als will turn oil whether parol evidence is admissible with respect to
policy interpretations in a case in a particular jurisdiction. lo7 As
noted earlier, different forums may apply different choice of law
principles to this determination.1 08 A decision as to whether to ex
pend the time and expense of substantial discovery into parol evi
dence and drafting history may have important tactical
implications.
b.

Reinsurance materials

One area of discovery that carriers often resist involves corre
spondence and communications with reinsurers. Reinsurance is es
sentially the insurance of insurers. 109 In many cases, a particular
insurance policy will be reinsured, either individually or as part of a
group of policies, by one or more reinsurers, and the insurance
company will report claims and other relevant information to the
reinsurer. llo In general, insurers and reinsurers vigorously contest
the discovery of their reinsurance files and their communications
with one another.1 11 The theory is that the reinsurers have no obli
gations to the insured and that communications between the insur
ers and reinsurers are confidential communications that are often a
105. E.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 623 A.2d 1128
(Del. Super. Ct. 1992); cf Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding summary judgment was precluded where "[the defendant] submitted affidavits
of the drafters of the industry-wide standardized CGL clause asserting an explication
completely at variance from [the plaintiffs] construction of the contract").
106. See, e.g., Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
117 F.R.D. 283, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1986); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chern.
Co., 558 A.2d 1091, 1093-96 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989).
107. See Independent Petrochemical, 117 F.R.D. at 287 n.3.
108. Id.
109. For a description of reinsurance and the reinsurance industry, see Unigard
Security Insurance Co. v. North River Insurance Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (2d Cir.
1993).
110. Id. at 1054.
111. E.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 136 F.R.D. 1,2
(D.D.C. 1990).
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part of a joint defense,112
In recent years, a number of courts have compelled discovery
of reinsurance materials and communications,113 Initially, they rea
son that reinsurance arrangements are subject to procedural rules
that expressly permit discovery of insurance information. 114 Sev
eral courts have held that reinsurance information is discoverable
pursuant to this provision. 11s
Courts have also tended to find that communications between
the insurer and the reinsurer in the ordinary course of business, par
ticularly where no lawyers are involved, are discoverable,116 Be
cause reinsurance files often contain information concerning an
insurer's views on the underlying litigation, policy interpretation,
and the availability of coverage, reinsurance files can be a fertile
source of discovery for an insured.
c.

Insurer discovery: Will policyholder files lose applicable
privileges?

Insurers confronted with coverage litigation typically seek ex
tensive discovery into the files of the insured concerning insurance,
the original placement of the insurance and the underlying dispute.
The scope of the insurer's investigation into the underlying dispute
can be extremely broad and may extend to discovery of documents
that are ordinarily privileged.
(1) Choice of law and issues of privilege
The issue of controlling law for disputes over policyholder as
sertions of privilege is far from settled. The federal courts and most
states view the protection for work product and the rules on admis
sibility of subsequent remedial measures as procedural matters gov
erned by the law of the forum,117 On the other hand, the
availability of privileges, like the attorney-client or self-evaluation
privileges, sometimes may be viewed as a substantive matter that is
112. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chern. Co., 558 A.2d 1091, 1096
(Del. Super. Ct. 1989).
113. [d.; Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 152 F.R.D. 132 (N.D. III.
1993).
114. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
.
115. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental III. Corp., 116 F.R.D. 78, 84
(N.D. III. 1987); Stauffer Chern. Co., 558 A.2d at 1096.
116. E.g., Allendale, 152 F.R.D. at 137.
117. E.g., Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1277 (3d Cir. 1992) (subse
quent remedial measures); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, No. CV 94-4414-JDG, 1995 WL
313729 at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (work product doctrine).
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determined by an analysis of other choice of law principles. 118
The determination of what law applies is necessarily complex
in a coverage case, where privileged materials are often prepared in
reliance on the law of the jurisdiction in which the lawsuit was
. pending or where the work was done and subsequently sought
through discovery in a completely' different forum. The situation is
further complicated when an insurer seeks production of arguably
privileged policyholder documents, and a court must decide
whether any implied waiver is determined by the substantive law
that controls the insurance contract, the law that controls the pend
ing coverage action, or the substantive or procedural law that con
trolled the underlying case against the insured.
The confusion and complexity with these choice of law issues is
so substantial that some lawyers proceed on the assumption that
documents prepared in connection with litigation for which an in
sured may subsequently seek insurance coverage may be subject to
discovery by the insurer. Right or wrong, this assumption dictates
that defense counsel and policyholder employees should exercise
unusual care in preparing documents concerning any matters for
which coverage may be sought.
(2) The attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine
A number of jurisdictions have required insureds to produce
materials normally protected by the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine in coverage litigation with their insurers.
One of the leading cases is the decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines In
surance CO.119 In that case, the court held that these protections
from discovery do not apply to material produced in underlying lia
bility suits, on the theory that such material was were prepared for
the "mutual benefit" of insurer and insured, even if the insurer de
nies coverage and becomes the policyholder's adversary in a later
coverage dispute. 12o Several courts have adopted, at least in part,
the rule enunciated in Waste Management. Some of them base their
decisions on the existence of a cooperation clause in the insurance
contract. 121 Others rely on variations of the "at issue" doctrine,
118.
(1971).
119.
120.
121.

See

FED.

R.

EVID.

501;

REsrATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 139

579 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1991).
Id. at 328-29, 330-31.
See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Employer's Commercial Union, No. CV
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under which documents may lose their privileged status if put di
rectly into issue in a particular case.
Although Waste Management recognizes that documents re
lated to insurance coverage and any coverage dispute do not lose
their privileged status, many courts have rejected the rule and rea
soning of Waste Management but uphold the attorney-client privi
lege and work product doctrine with respect to documents prepared
in the underlying case for which coverage is sought,122 The court in
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp.123 articulated in detail
its reasons for rejecting the Waste Management rule:
To hold that an insurance policy creates a contractual waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, even when the insurance company
later sues the insured contending the insured's claim is not cov
ered by the policy, would completely eviscerate the attorney-cli
ent privilege. Absent a spowing that the parties intended the
language of the cooperation clauses of the insurance policies at
issue here to work a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, [this]
court declines to follow the holding of Waste Management to find
a contractual waiver of the privilege. 124

The court also stated on similar grounds that it "finds unsound
the Illinois Supreme Court's extension of the 'common interest' ex
ception to the attorney-client privilege."125
(3) The self-evaluation privilege
Some insureds have claimed that a different privilege, the
"self-evaluation privilege," protects certain confidential informa
tion from discovery.126 The judicially created "self-evaluation" or
2595 (D. Colo. July 15, 1993); EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 18, 23 (D.
Conn. 1992); CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employer's Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1128
(Alaska 1993); Carrier Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., No. 35 23 83, 1992 WL 478585 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1992).
122. See, e.g., North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 797 F.
Supp. 363, 367 (D.N.J. 1992); Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D.
408, 418 (D. Del. 1992).
123. 140 F.R.D. 381, 386 (D. Minn. 1992).
124. ld.
125. ld. at 386-87; see also Rockwell Int'I Corp. v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d
153, 156-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("We ... refuse to adopt the rules announced by the
l11inois Supreme Court in a similar case, Waste Management."), review denied, 1994 CaL
LEXIS 5610 (Oct. 20, 1994) and cases cited therein.
126. For a description of the "self-critical" or "self-evaluation" privilege gener
ally, see Reichhold Chemicals., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 524-27 (N.D. Fla.
1994) and cases cited therein. For an analysis of the self-evaluation privilege in the
context of employment discrimination cases, see Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. SUpp.
1434, 1439 (D. Kan. 1995).
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"self-critical" "privilege prevents disclosure of confidential, critical,
evaluative [and] deliberative material whenever the public interest
in confidentiality outweighs an individual's need for full discov
ery."127 The self-evaluation privilege has not been adopted by all
courts128 and many of those who have adopted it have limited its
application to subjective impressions and opinions, not objective
facts.129
At least one court has stated that the self-evaluation privilege
should not apply in coverage cases where the information sought to
be protected relates to the insured's state of mind at issue in the
coverage case: "Without access to the documents which defendants
seek to inspect, it would be virtually impossible for the insurance
companies to determine whether or not to provide coverage....
Evidence necessary to the determination of whether the pollution
was intentional and knowing cannot be shielded. "130 Although it
has not been applied in this context, insurers will almost certainly
argue that the reasoning of Waste Management and its progeny
should be applied to reach a similar result.
11.

Public Policy and Punitive Damages

Some courts hold that even if an insurance policy otherwise
provides coverage, intentional discrimination is uninsurable as a
matter of public policy.131 Indeed, in some states, such as Califor
nia, statutes render insurance for certain types of intentional dis
crimination unenforceable as against public policy,132 Application
127. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 620 A.2d 462,464 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
128. See, e.g., Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 101 (D.N.J. 1989).
129. See, e.g., Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 434-35 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) and cases cited
therein.
130. CPC, 620 A.2d at 468 (citations omitted).
131. See, e.g., Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir.
1980) (suggesting that coverage for intentional discrimination is uninsurable as a matter
of public policy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 778 (1980) (same); cf Ranger
Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1009 (Fla. 1989) (analogizing to
Title VII, finding intentional discrimination not involving employment discrimination
uninsurable as a matter of public policy). But see School Dist. for Royal.oak v. Conti
nental Casualty Co., 912 F.2d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Public policy normally favors
enforcement of insurance contracts according to their terms ...."); Independent Sch.
Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Minn. 1994).
132. E.g.• CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993); Save Mart Supermarkets v. Under
writers at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (construing the California
statute); see also, e.g., New York Insurance Department Circular Letter No.6, Insur
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of public policy to prevent coverage that is otherwise available
under the terms of a particular insurance policy gives rise to diffi
cult conflict of law issues that are similar to those encountered in
cases that consider the insurability of punitive damages.
Consider, for example, the situation where a lawsuit is brought
in Illinois for coverage for discriminatory conduct at a factory in
Texas. The policy was purchased in Illinois through an Illinois bro
ker from an insurer located in California. The underlying lawsuit
for discrimination was tried in Texas state court and resulted in a
multi-million dollar judgment for compensatory and punitive dani
ages against the policyholder. Texas public policy permits coverage
for punitive damages,133 Illinois public policy arguably does not,134
and a California statute renders coverage for intentional discrimina
tion unenforceable. 135 What law governs?
The question is admittedly difficult, and different courts are
likely to reach different results. Initially, it should be recognized
that different jurisdictions may control different issues within the
same case. 136 Thus, even if the policy was delivered in Illinois, and
Illinois law controlled policy construction issues, Illinois law may
not control the application of public policy principles to determine
whether insurance coverage for punitive damages is available in a
particular case.
This issue was recently considered by the Illinois appellate
court in United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Insurance CO.137 The
case involved an Illinois lawsuit concerning coverage for the
$300,000 portion of a settlement allocable to potential liability for
punitive damages. The settled claim involved property and prop
,
ance Coverage for Discrimination Claims based upon Disparate Impact and Vicarious
Liability (May 31, 1994), reprinted in Joseph P. Monteleone, Recent Developments in
Insurance for Employment Related Litigation, Appendix C, in PRACflCING LAW INSTI
TUTE, Employment Law Litlbility Claims: What You Need to Know About Insurance
Coverage, 716 PLIIComm 176 (May 10, 1995) (Circular Letter of State of New York
Insurance Department concluding that liability coverage for disparate treatment vio
lates public policy, while coverage for disparate impact does not); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
175 § 47, cI. 6(b), construed in Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp.
80,83-84 (D. Mass. 1992).
133. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d
693, 703-04 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
134. Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (III. App. Ct. 1981)
(IllinOis may permit insurance for punitive damages based on vicarious liability). See
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 568 N.E.2d 9, 15 (III. App.
Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 116 (1991).
135. CAL. INS. CoDE § 533 (West 1993).
136. E.g., RESTAlEMENf (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 188, 193 (1971).
137. 643 N.E.2d 1226 (III. App. Ct. 1994).
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erty owners located in South Carolina. The insurers argued that
this portion of the settlement was not covered because punitive
damages are uninsurable under Illinois law.
The court rejected the insurers' argument. Beginning with the
choice of law issues, it held that "[i]n the absence of a specific
choice of law provision, the general choice of law rules of the forum
state, Illinois, control."138 Noting that Illinois applies the "most sig
nificant contacts" test to determine which forum's law applies,139
the court concluded that South Carolina law should control the in
surability of the potentially punitive portion of the underlying claim
because the underlying case was filed in South Carolina, the under
lying plaintiff lived there, and the underlying injury occurred there.
According to the court, under these circumstances South Carolina
"would have the greater interest in determining whether the in
sured should be able to recover costs relating to the potentially pu
nitive portion of the settlement entered into in that underlying
action."l40 The court found further support for its conclusion that
South Carolina law should control in language contained in some of
the policies that provided that punitive damages would be covered
"where permitted by law."141
After determining that normal choice of law principles would
require application of South Carolina law, the court considered the
issue of whether an Illinois court's application of South Carolina
law, which permits insurance coverage for punitive damages, would
violate Illinois public policy, which may not permit such coverage.
The court concluded that this application was not a problem in
the context of the settlement:
[W]e cannot say that the application of South Carolina law will
have much of an effect on Illinois citizens or on Illinois' regula
tion of its insurers. Moreover ... South Carolina has a significant
interest in regulating the insurers who issue policies covering un
derlying claims which occur in that State, as well as punitive dam
ages assessed in those actions.142

The court relied on this analysis to hold that there was coverage for
the settlement even under those policies that did not contain a pro
138.
139.
App. Ct.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1250.
But see Allen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 574 N.E.2d 55, 60·61 (Ill.
1991).

Gypsum,643 N.E.2d at 1250.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
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vision allowing coverage for punitive damages "where permitted by
law."
The decision in Gypsum is consistent with a Texas appellate
court decision that holds that Texas has a strong interest in applying
its rule permitting insurance of punitive damages to verdicts en
tered by Texas juries, even where the policies at issue were negoti
ated, paid for, and delivered outside of Texas. 143 Given these
precedents, it is likely that an Illinois court would permit coverage
for punitive damages in our hypothetical case, if it was provided by
an applicable insurance policy.
This leaves the question of the California policy against cover
age for intentional discrimination. This choice of law analysis
should be similar to the analysis concerning punitive damages. The
point, of course, is that these public policy issues can be extremely
important and must be carefully considered in deciding where to
file suit. l44
12. Attorneys' Fees in Coverage Cases
The law varies as to whether a policyholder's right to attorneys'
fees in a coverage case is a procedural matter controlled by the law
of the forum or a substantive matter controlled by other conflict of
law principles.145 Most jurisdictions follow the general rule that in
surance coverage disputes are no different from other breach of
contract cases so that no attorneys' fees are available to either party
in the absence of a contractual agreement or controlling statute. 146
Some states, however, have statutes that permit policyholder recov
eries of reasonable attorneys' fees under certain circumstances. 147
In addition, there are some jurisdictions in which a policyholder
"'who is compelled to assume the burden of legal action to obtain
143. American Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prod. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987), reh'g denied, (1988).
144. See Mencor Enters., Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., 235 Cal. Rptr. 464, 466 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1987) (California courts will apply California law if applying the law of other
jurisdictions would violate strong California public policy).
145. See, e.g., EI Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. CIY. A. 12083,
1994 WL 728816, at *4-*5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1994) (attorneys' fees are substantive in
nature when prescribed by statute); Du-Wel Prods., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
565 A.2d 1113, 1120 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (attorneys' fees are procedural in
nature), cert. denied, 583 A.2d 316 (NJ. 1990).
146. See, e.g., Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d
156, 167-69 (Wis. 1984) (refusing to depart from American rule that parties pay their
own attorneys' fees absent a contractual or statutory provision to the contrary).
147. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1994). See also
infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
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the benefit of its insurance contract is entitled to attorney fees'
whether or not the insurance policy contains a provision for such
fees."148 Obviously, the availability of attorneys' fees is an impor
tant bargaining point and financial issue that deserves consideration
in any coverage case.
13. Consequential Damages, Special Remedies, Bad Faith
Actions, and Unfair Trade Practice Statutes
Suits for insurance coverage normally are based on a breach of
contract theory. Although contract actions may allow recovery of
consequential damages, such as attorneys' fees expended on the
coverage case,149 they are not normally conducive to claims for pu
nitive or enhanced damages. 15o
There are, however, some situations in which certain jurisdic
tions offer special remedies in coverage cases. For example, some
states recognize special remedies for breach of a duty to defend or
for a refusal to settle within policy limits. In Fragman Construction
Co. v. Preston Construction Co., for example, the court held that
insurers that breach their duty to defend may be estopped from as
serting coverage defenses such as late notice,151 Similarly, as a co
rollary of traditional principles of consequential damages, most
jurisdictions hold that an insurer that refuses to settle within policy
limits may be held responsible for damages in excess of policy lim
its, in the event the case must be tried and liability is imposed as a
result,152
In addition to these contract law theories, various states have
recognized actions for bad faith that may result in punitive dam
ages, particularly when the conduct of the insurer either is espe
cially dishonest or affects the general public. 153 To the extent those
148. Public Util. Dist. No.1 v. International Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1034 (Wash.
1994) (en bane) (quoting Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 673,
682 (Wash. 1991».
149. See, e.g., Hegler v. Gulf Ins. Co., 243 S.E.2d 443 (S.C. 1978).
150. See, e.g., DiBlasi v. Aetna Life & casualty Ins. Co., 542 N.Y.S.2d 187,192
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (no punitive damages even if breach of contract was wilful and
without justification).
151. 274 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) ("If potential coverage was present,
Aetna breached its duty to defend and is estopped from raising any exclusionary cover
age defenses ....").
152. See, e.g., Walbrook Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 7 cal. Rptr. 2d 513,
517 (cal. Ct. App. 1992).
153. See, e.g., DiBlasi, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 192 (high degree of dishonesty or moral
turpitude implies criminal indifference to civil obligations); Samovar of Russia Jewelry
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actions sound in tort rather than in contract,IS4 they are often con
trolled by the law of the jurisdiction where the wrong occurred. ISS
Tort law choice of law principles may yield a different controlling
law than application of the choice of law principles applicable to
contract cases.
In addition to bad faith cases, many jurisdictions have statutory
provisions that provide special statutory causes of action and reme
dies for insurer failures to honor insurance contracts. IS6 In most
cases, the statute itself sets forth the situations in which it will be
applicable. ls7 The Maine statute governing unfair claims practices,
for example, applies on its face only to certain misrepresentations,
failures to acknowledge and review claims within a reasonable time
following written notice of a claim, threats to appeal arbitration
awards solely to compel lesser settlements, or failures to affirm cov
erage, reserve appropriate defenses, or deny coverage within a rea
sonable time after receiving proof of loss forms.lss
An attorney for a client that has been denied insurance cover
age should carefully consider the extent to which consequential
damages, attorneys' fees or multiple or enhanced damages may be
available to his client under the law of potentially available
jurisdictions.
V.

WHEN CAN You SUE?

In some cases, where an insured has an indemnity policy and

has paid out defense costs or an adverse judgment or settlement,
there is little question of the policyholder's right to sue for recov
ery. The analysis may be more difficult where an insurer is acting
under a reservation of rights, and the insured is not yet in a position
to make a demand for payment.
The traditional rule in federal court and in most state courts is
that there must be an actual controversy to support a declaratory
judgment action. IS9 For this reason, the courts, in general, will not
Antique Corp. v. Generali, 476 N.Y.S.2d 869,873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) ("fraudulent,
criminal or dishonest acts by the insurer concerning or affecting the general public").
154. See, e.g., Judge Trucking Co. v. Estate of Cooper, CIY. A. Nos. 92C-03-041,
93C-04-023, 93C-07-025, 1994 WL 680029, at *3-*4 (De\. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 1994).
155. [d.
156. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (1992 & Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1994).
157. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (1992 & Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1994).
158. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1994).
159. E.g., Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir.
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permit an insurer to file a declaratory judgment action where the
insurer has made no clear demand for coverage. As the court ex
plained in Atlanta International Insurance Co. v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway. Co., 160
[1]n cases where ... all determinative facts giving rise to the po
tential policy coverage dispute have occurred prior to the initial
demand upon the insurance company, no actual controversy
arises among the parties until such time as the issuing company is
called upon to either payor defend a claim on behalf of its in
sured under the terms of the policy in question. 161

Most courts give strong deference to the first forum to assume
jurisdiction over a case. 162 Because the choice of forum also con
trols choice of law and may be outcome determinative, the decision
of when a decision is sufficiently ripe to support a lawsuit requires
careful consideration and analysis.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Suits for insurance coverage present wide variations in degrees
of complexity. Because of the diverse principles that govern critical
legal issues, forum selection may be particularly crucial. The com
plexity of forum selection in a coverage case is often compounded
by issues of jurisdiction and venue and variations in the choice of
law principles employed by various courts.
. As a result, like any significant commercial litigation, such
cases require careful planning and analysis. The failure to consider
carefully where suit can be brought and the likely course of events
in a particular forum can lead to unanticipated outcomes and unfor
tunate, unforeseen results.

1994); City of Elgin v. County of Cook, 629 N.E.2d 86, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 1995 WL 646541 (Ill. Nov. 2, 1995).
160. 938 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Illinois law).
161. Id. at 83 (quoting Gibraltar Ins. Co. v. Varkalis, 263 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Ill.
1970».
162. E.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 848 S.W.2d
251,255 (Tex. App. 1993), reh'g overruled (1993), error denied (1994).

